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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                     
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 
 Appellant Lawrence Neadle, Jr., pled guilty to one 
count of mail fraud.  At sentencing, the district court imposed a 
sixty-month term of imprisonment and a three-year term of 
supervised release.  On appeal, Neadle contends that the district 
court misapplied the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
("Guidelines") in its calculation of the victims' loss under 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b) and its upward departure based on the amount 
of that loss.  He also alleges that the court erred in granting 
an upward departure based on psychological harm to the victims 
and on loss of confidence in the insurance industry.  We hold 
that the district court properly calculated the loss arising from 
the appellant's fraud and that it did not err in its upward 
departure based on the amount of loss.  We find, however, that 
the district court erred in its conclusion to depart upward for 
psychological harm/loss of confidence.  We will, therefore, for 
the reasons stated below, vacate defendant's sentence and remand 
for resentencing pursuant to this opinion. 
I. 
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A. 
 The appellant, Lawrence M. Neadle, Jr., and two co-
defendants were indicted on one count of conspiracy and eight 
counts of mail and wire fraud on November 18, 1992.  After one 
co-defendant was acquitted, a superseding indictment charged 
Neadle and the other co-defendant with substantially the same 
offenses.  Count I of the Superseding Indictment charged them 
with a conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; Counts II and 
III charged them with mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341; 
and Counts IV through IX charged them with wire fraud in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.   
 In October 1993, Neadle changed his plea to Count II of 
the superseding indictment (mail fraud) from not guilty to 
guilty.  Pursuant to the plea agreement, the remaining counts 
against him were dismissed at sentencing.  On July 6, 1994, the 
district court sentenced Neadle to sixty months imprisonment and 
placed him under supervised release for a three-year period upon 
his release from prison.  Neadle was released pending appeal and 
filed his notice of appeal the next day. 
 The charges against Neadle arose from his creation of 
the American Property and Casualty Insurance Company ("AMPAC"). 
Neadle was chief executive officer of the company.  In late 1987, 
he applied to the Division of Banking and Insurance of the Virgin 
Islands ("Insurance Division") for a license to form AMPAC.  At 
that time, the Insurance Division required an insurance company 
to have a minimum capital of $450,000, an initial surplus capital 
of $250,000, and a bond of $500,000.  Neadle provided the 
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Insurance Commissioner with a surety bond for $500,000 but 
misrepresented the amount of the company's initial capital.0  
 On January 5, 1988, Neadle caused a letter to be sent 
through the United States mail to the Insurance Division, stating 
that AMPAC had unencumbered certificates of deposit in the sum of 
$700,000 in the Naples Federal Savings and Loan Association 
("Naples Federal") in Naples, Florida.  In fact, however, the 
certificates were encumbered, as Neadle was fully aware.  Unaware 
of the deception, the government of the Virgin Islands in January 
1988 issued AMPAC a license to do business in that territory. 
 After obtaining the loan for the certificates of 
deposit, AMPAC paid interest on the loan of $2,300 a month. 
AMPAC's quarterly reports to the Insurance Division, however, 
listed the $700,000 in encumbered certificates as an asset but 
did not list that amount as an offsetting liability, and the 
reports did not include the interest payments.   
 In September 1989, Hurricane Hugo hit the Virgin 
Islands.  AMPAC was unable to meet the resulting claims of its 
policyholders.  The Virgin Islands government established the 
Hurricane Hugo Fund Program to pay the claims for AMPAC and 
American Alliance, the other Virgin Islands insurance company 
that failed as a result of claims arising out of the hurricane.   
B. 
                                                           
0
 Subsequently, the Insurance Division became concerned 
about the surety company, which had issued the bond, and required 
Neadle to post the $500,000 in cash.  Neadle complied. 
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 At the July 12, 1993, pre-trial hearing in this matter, 
witnesses testified regarding the Insurance Division's capital 
requirements.  Derek Hodge, the Lieutenant Governor and Insurance 
Commissioner of the Virgin Islands at that time, testified that 
he would not have certified a company to do business without the 
$700,000 minimum in capital and paid-in surplus.  Hodge also 
stated that he followed guidelines, promulgated by the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, requiring all insurance 
companies to maintain a solvency ratio of three to two in 
premiums to surplus.  He further testified regarding the methods 
he used to ensure that insurance companies doing business in the 
Virgin Islands complied with the requirements.  He stated that, 
among other things, he reviewed audits conducted by Insurance 
Commission examiners, who reviewed quarterly financial statements 
submitted by the companies.     
 Deverita Sturdivant, Director of the Insurance Division 
from January 1987 through the end of 1989, testified that the 
$700,000 minimum capital requirement applied to new businesses. 
She stated that once a company started writing policies, the 
company might need to increase its capital to ensure the proper 
premium dollars to surplus ratio.  Sturdivant testified further 
that had she discovered that AMPAC did not meet the minimum 
capital requirement, the Insurance Division could have demanded 
that unencumbered assets be infused into the company or, in the 
alternative, that the company be liquidated.    
 In May 1994, the district court held a hearing to 
address the defense objections to the Presentence Investigation 
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and Report.  Ricardo Luaces, a claims examiner employed by the 
Insurance Division from 1989 to 1993, testified that the gross 
figure for Hurricane Hugo losses incurred on property insured by 
AMPAC was $37,655,038.  The adjusted Hurricane Hugo claims of 
AMPAC policyholders amounted to $24,438,748.  Roland Riviere, an 
independent insurance adjuster retained to assist in adjusting 
the claims of AMPAC's insureds for Hugo-related damage, quoted 
the same figure.  
 John McDonald, the Chief Examiner for the Insurance 
Division during the time that the Insurance Division compiled 
Hugo-related claims, testified that the best estimate of non-Hugo 
related claims on AMPAC was $500,000.  He further testified that, 
in early 1988, the Insurance Division had discovered that AMPAC 
had no general ledger -- the basic accounting format in which 
debits and credits are captured -- so that AMPAC's assets and 
liabilities could not be determined.  At that time, the 
Commission also detected a commingling of funds between AMPAC and 
Caribbean Mutual, another of Neadle's companies.  McDonald 
testified that the Commission directed Neadle to correct these 
accounting problems but that by the time of the hurricane, there 
were still no accounting records from which AMPAC's assets could 
be determined.  McDonald confirmed, however, that one of Neadle's 
accountants, Norman Erasso, had begun implementing the requested 
accounting procedures.  Erasso, however, left the territory when 
Hugo struck and did not return. 
 Neadle testified that, as of the date of the hurricane, 
he had reinsurance of $4 million.  He contended the reinsurer had 
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assured him that this amount would be adequate, based on previous 
hurricane damage in the Virgin Islands.      
C. 
 At sentencing, the district court applied the 1988 
edition of the Sentencing Guidelines, the version in effect on 
the date of the offense.0  The court found that because Neadle 
"obtained his license [to issue insurance] by fraud and 
trickery," he was responsible for a loss of $20,438,748, which 
represented the adjusted claims of $24,438,748, less AMPAC's $4 
million in reinsurance.  Appendix ("App.") at 399-400.  Pursuant 
to § 2F1.1(b)(L) of the 1988 Guidelines, the base level for fraud 
offenses was 6; if the loss exceeded $5,000,000, an eleven level 
increase was to be added to the base.  The court granted this 
eleven level increase.   
 Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2), the court also 
awarded a two level increase on the alternative grounds that the 
crime involved more than minimal planning or more than one 
victim.  The court concluded  
that the offense was by its nature more complex than 
simple; that the defendant did take significant 
affirmative steps to conceal the offense; that the 
                                                           
0The district court properly applied the version of the 
Guidelines in effect at the date of the offense because, at the 
time of sentencing, § 2F1.1 of the Guidelines had been amended by 
adding four new offense level increases for losses exceeding 10, 
20, 40 and 80 million dollars.  This amendment would call for a 
16 level increase over the base offense level for the loss as 
calculated here, rather than the 11 level increase which had been 
in effect until November 1989.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 622-23 (3d Cir. 1995) (if application of 
guidelines in effect at sentencing results in more severe penalty 
than that in effect at time of offense, earlier version controls; 
applying a guideline amendment that enhances the penalty offends 
the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution).    
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offense itself required planning and the falsification 
of a series of documents; and that these acts involved 
a series of discrete decisions, clearly not opportune 
in nature. 
 
App. at 404-05.  Moreover, the court stated "that the hundreds of 
policyholders and the government comprise the victims of the 
offense."  App. at 405.  The court granted a two level decrease 
for Neadle's acceptance of responsibility.    
 The court then departed upward from the guideline 
offense level on two grounds.  First, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§2F1.1, comment 10, the court found that the fact that the loss 
amounts were substantially above the highest amount listed in the 
Guidelines ($5,000,000) warranted an upward departure.  Looking 
by analogy to the 1993 amendments to the Guidelines, the court 
departed upward a further five levels (from level 11 to 16), 
which corresponded to the increase under the 1993 version of the 
Guidelines for a loss exceeding $20,000,000.  Second, the court 
found U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment 9, to warrant an upward departure 
of one level for the "psychological harm risked or caused by the 
offense" and one level for "the loss of confidence in an 
important institution." 
 In sum, the court departed upward seven levels from an 
offense level of 17 to an offense level of 24, which corresponded 
to a guideline sentencing range of from 51 to 63 months.  The 
court then imposed a sentence of 60 months.     
II. 
 The District Court of the Virgin Islands had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3241.  We have jurisdiction, 
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, to review a final order of a 
district court and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, to review a 
sentence imposed under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 
We exercise plenary review over legal questions concerning the 
meaning of sentencing guidelines but apply the clearly erroneous 
standard to factual determinations underlying their application. 
United States v. Daddona, 34 F.3d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, __ 
U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 515 (1994); United States v. Katora, 981 F.2d 
1398, 1401 (3d Cir. 1992). 
III. 
 We first address Neadle's challenge to the district 
court's interpretation of "loss" as it is calculated pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b), an issue over which this court exercises 
plenary review.  See United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  We conclude that the district court properly 
calculated the loss, arising from the appellant's fraud, to be 
$20,438,748, that figure being the net, adjusted $24,438,748 loss 
to victims whose property was insured with AMPAC at the time that 
Hurricane Hugo struck St. Croix, reduced by the amount of AMPAC's 
reinsurance ($4 million).  
 In his appeal, Neadle raises two grounds for 
challenging the district court's calculation of the amount of 
loss.  First, he argues that, after obtaining the license to form 
AMPAC, he intended to run the company in a proper, business-like 
way.  Second, he contends that the property losses suffered by 
AMPAC policy holders resulted from an unforeseeable act of God, 
so that he would have been unable to pay the claims even in the 
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absence of his fraud.  Therefore, he maintains, the loss figure 
should not be used to increase his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. 
§ 2F1.1.   
 The district court based its computations upon the 
actual loss suffered by the AMPAC policyholders, rather than upon 
the loss which Neadle intended to inflict, see U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, 
comment 7 (1993) ("if an intended loss that the defendant was 
attempting to inflict can be determined, this figure will be used 
if it is greater than the actual loss)0 or upon the offender's 
gross gain from committing the fraud, see Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 
936 (breach of fiduciary duty by officer of a financial 
institution may justify using the "gross gain" alternative to 
estimate loss).  The court also sentenced Neadle based on the 
loss as of the date of sentencing, see United States v. Kopp, 951 
F.2d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 1991), rather than the loss as of the date 
of the offense, see Shaffer, 35 F.3d at 115, so that the 
reinsurance Neadle had contracted for was subtracted from the 
loss. 
 Neadle characterizes the case as analogous to a 
contract case in which he was planning to perform, albeit after 
obtaining the contract by fraudulent means.0  He argues that 
                                                           
0In a fraud case, the intended loss may be no loss at all, when 
fraud is committed to obtain a contract or a license or a loan to 
do business which the offender hopes will succeed -- as the 
defendant here claims was his intent.  See e.g. United States v. 
Shaffer, 35 F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1994).  However, under the 
Guidelines, intended loss is relevant in the loss computation 
only if the intended loss is greater than the actual loss. 
 
0
 The government portrays this fraud case as analogous to 
a simple theft case, arguing that the "property" taken was the 
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because he did not intend to inflict any loss, no dollar amount 
is attributable to him.  App. at 397.  He emphasizes that when 
the government requested that he provide $500,000 cash in lieu of 
the $500,000 bond required by law, he complied.  Moreover, he 
notes that his accountant, Erasso, had begun to comply with the 
government's accounting suggestions but left the Virgin Islands 
when Hugo struck.  Finally, he maintains that he attempted to get 
adequate reinsurance coverage and that he did not engage in, and 
the government did not prove that he engaged in, day-to-day fraud 
in the operation of AMPAC.   
 Contrary to Needle's argument, however, there is strong 
record support that Neadle not only misrepresented the amount of 
his initial capital investment but also engaged in fraudulent 
conduct to perpetuate his business.  During the eighteen month 
period in which AMPAC sold insurance policies, the Insurance 
Division could not locate basic accounting records from which it 
could assess the company's assets and liabilities.  Moreover, 
examiners found a commingling of funds between AMPAC and another 
of Neadle's companies, Caribbean Mutual.  In addition, the 
company continued to file financial statements that fraudulently 
concealed the fact that AMPAC's $700,000 in certificates of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
receipt of the license to sell casualty insurance in the Virgin 
Islands, which resulted in the Hugo-related losses.  The 
Government argues that "the sentencing court could properly have 
assessed the loss occasioned by the appellant's fraud as being 
the value of all property insured by AMPAC, including property 
that was not damaged by Hurricane Hugo."  Even if we were to 
accept the Government's position, this court has held that "[t]he 
fraud guideline . . . has never endorsed sentencing based on the 
worst-case scenario potential loss."  Kopp, 951 F.2d at 529. 
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deposit at Naples Federal were encumbered assets.000 in 
certificates of deposit at Naples Federal were not unencumbered 
assets.  Finally, although Neadle obtained reinsurance, no 
reinsurer could adequately assess AMPAC's true reinsurance 
requirements unless the reinsurer was provided with basic records 
indicating AMPAC's assets and liabilities.  The deceitful and 
slipshod way in which Neadle ran the business supports the 
district court's attribution of responsibility to him for the 
losses.  We conclude that the actual loss caused to AMPAC 
policyholders by the fraud was the proper basis for the loss 
computation under § 2F1.1(b).0 
 We also find Neadle's argument that Hurricane Hugo was 
an act of nature beyond his control and that the property losses 
occasioned thereby should not be used in calculating his sentence 
to be without force.  Hurricanes are a continuing threat in the 
Caribbean.  Coverage for hurricane damage is a type of coverage 
which is often specifically sought, albeit not always easily 
found, in that area.  Moreover, the insurance policies at issue 
contained express coverage of hurricane-related property losses. 
                                                           
0
 We do not agree with the dissent that the loss to the 
policyholders here was not caused, at least in part, by Neadle's 
fraud in obtaining the license to do business.  The dissent 
implies that the individuals, who purchased policies from AMPAC, 
could not have purchased insurance coverage from any other source 
and for that reason did not suffer any loss from the damage done 
by Hurricane Hugo which they would not otherwise have suffered. 
However, despite the tightness of the insurance market in the 
Virgin Islands, the record before us does not support the 
supposition, and Neadle does not claim, that there was no other 
insurance coverage available in the Virgin Islands market for the 
AMPAC policy holders. 
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Neadle did not attempt to sell hurricane coverage in Chicago or 
in Wichita; he sold it in the Caribbean, a hurricane zone.   
 Moreover, as we have previously held in Kopp, it is not 
appropriate to reduce the amount of the loss, as computed under 
the Guidelines, in order to reflect other causes of the loss 
which were beyond the defendant's control.  951 F.2d at 531.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b), comment 11.  An intervening force that 
increases a fraud-related loss will not decrease the loss 
valuation but will only provide possible grounds for a downward 
departure.  Kopp, 951 F.2d at 531.   
 To the extent that the defendant's objection to the 
loss computation in this case can be construed to be a request 
for a downward departure based on the nature of the risk 
involved, the district court clearly rejected that request in the 
court's determination to depart upward in computing the amount of 
the loss.  The district court, in determining to depart upward 
due to the underrepresentation of the loss in the 1988 version of 
the Guidelines, cited United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  App. at 411.  In that case, we vacated the district 
court's judgment and remanded for resentencing after clarifying 
the scope of the court's power to depart downward based on 
application note 11 to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1.  We stated that "a 
wrongdoer should [not] completely escape a sentencing enhancement 
if his scheme involved a substantial risk of loss merely because, 
under his own rosy scenario, no loss was intended."  Monaco, 23 
F.3d at 799 n.10.  We held that the court's discretion to depart 
downward pursuant to application note 11 is limited by the 
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inherent risk of loss in the perpetrator's fraud, explaining that 
"risk is one of the losses that a perpetrator of fraud imposes on 
his victims."  Id.   
 We believe that the district court properly considered 
the risk, in this case of a hurricane, an act of God, imposed on 
AMPAC's insureds because of the defendant's fraudulent conduct. 
Had Neadle expressly made a request for a downward departure for 
an act of God, the court would have been proper in denying it. In 
holding AMPAC out as insuring against a known risk, defendant 
extracted premiums from unsuspecting policyholders who believed 
that they were securing protection when in fact that protection 
was an empty shell.  Moreover, defendant's misrepresentations 
persisted throughout the period AMPAC was operating.      
 Neadle's arguments obscure the fact that but for his 
fraud, he would not have been in the insurance business.  By 
deceiving the government concerning the $700,000 certificates of 
deposit, by submitting fraudulent quarterly financial statements, 
and by failing to maintain financial records, Neadle misled the 
government for approximately a year and a half.  Had such 
fraudulent conduct not occurred, AMPAC would not have begun to 
operate as an insurance broker in the Virgin Islands and would 
not have continued to do so without maintaining adequate 
accounting records.  The district court recognized a clear causal 
connection between the fraud and the policy holders losses.  See 
App. at 399-400. 
 Our decision finds support in United States v. 
Robichaux, 995 F.2d 565 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 
15 
S. Ct. 322 (1993).  In Robichaux, the Fifth Circuit addressed a 
similar case in which mail and wire fraud led to the failure of 
an insurance company.  The defendant, Edward Robichaux, 
misrepresented that securities he had assigned to an insurance 
company were unencumbered assets.  Without the assets, the 
company "would have been undercapitalized and thus barred from 
any further insurance business."  Id. at 567.  The Louisiana 
Insurance Commission retained an independent firm to audit the 
company.  Robichaux verified to that firm the company's ownership 
of the securities in question.  Relying on the verification, the 
auditors issued a favorable report.  Approximately two years 
later, the insurance company was declared insolvent.  Id.  
 Robichaux argued that, for purposes of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, he should be held responsible only for the 
commissions he had been paid by the insurance company after he 
had made the fraudulent assignment of assets to it.  The district 
court, however, held him responsible for the losses attributable 
to the company's failure.  The Fifth Circuit agreed, holding that 
it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to find that 
the losses attributable to the insurance company's failure 
resulted from the defendant's actions in placing fraudulent 
securities on the company's books.  Id. at 571.  The court 
concluded that it was  
not clearly erroneous to assume that if [the 
independent auditor] had not issued a favorable audit 
for [the insurer], which only occurred because of [the 
insurer's] fraudulently inflated balance sheet, the 
Commission would have acted to liquidate the firm at an 
earlier date and minimized the losses.     
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Id..  The court upheld the district court's loss estimate -- an 
estimate of the loss that the state of Louisiana suffered as a 
result of the insurance company's failure -- as reasonable and 
not clearly erroneous.  Id. 
 Similarly, we find not clearly erroneous the district 
court's conclusion that Neadle's inadequate financing and 
recording at AMPAC caused the government of the Virgin Islands to 
license AMPAC and to permit it to remain in business which in 
turn caused the policy holders' Hugo-related losses.  We will 
affirm the district court's loss figure, because it is a 
reasonable estimate of the harm which resulted from Neadle's 
fraudulent scheme and which reasonably could be expected to 
result from a scheme which insured for hurricane damage in the 
Caribbean hurricane zone.  
IV. 
 We next must consider whether the court erred by 
reading U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, Application Note 9, to warrant an 
upward departure of one level for the "psychological harm risked 
or caused by the offense" and one level for "the loss of 
confidence in an important institution."  Since we are reviewing 
the district court's application of particular facts to a 
departure approved by the Sentencing Commission, we review only 
for clear error.  United States v. Astorri, 923 F.2d 1052, 1058 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 970 (1991).  We conclude that 
the evidence is insufficient to warrant an upward departure on 
either ground. 
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 A district court may impose a sentence outside the 
sentence range prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines where "the 
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
described."  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).  Application Note 9 to U.S.S.G. 
§ 2F1.1 provides a nonexclusive list of circumstances in which 
the loss calculated pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 -- the provision 
establishing the base level for offenses involving fraud or 
deceit -- "does not fully capture the harmfulness and seriousness 
of the conduct."  Among the examples of circumstances in which 
upward departures may be warranted are those on which the 
district court relied, instances in which "the offense caused or 
risked physical or psychological harm"0 and instances in which 
"the offense caused a loss of confidence in an important 
institution."   
 At sentencing, the court granted a one point upward 
departure based on "the psychological and social impact [of 
Neadle's offense] on the people of the Virgin Islands."  An 
                                                           
0
 Neadle argues that the district court improperly 
applied the 1988 edition of the Guidelines to this ground of 
departure. The 1993 edition of the Guidelines provides that an 
upward departure may be warranted where "the offense caused 
reasonably foreseeable, physical or psychological harm or severe 
emotional trauma."  U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment 10(c).  Neadle 
suggests that the 1993 provision should apply, because it 
clarifies, rather than substantively changes, the 1988 language.  
We need not consider this argument, because we do not find 
evidence of psychological harm within the meaning of the 
Guidelines in any event. 
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upward departure based on psychological harm is appropriate only 
"[i]f a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much more 
serious than that normally resulting from the commission of the 
offense."  U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3.  The Guidelines state that 
[n]ormally, psychological injury would be sufficiently 
severe to warrant application of this adjustment only 
when there is a substantial impairment of the 
intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral 
functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely 
to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when 
the impairment manifests itself by physical or 
psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior 
patterns. 
 
Id.   
 A district court is to be given considerable deference 
in assessing psychological impact on victims.  United States v. 
Astorri, 923 F.2d at 1058-59.  However, the court must not merely 
speculate regarding psychological harm.  In the instant case, the 
record is barren of evidence regarding physical or psychological 
harm sustained by the victims.  We do not find any evidence of 
the sort of "chronic substantial impairment of a victim's mental 
functioning" upon which this court has relied in upholding upward 
departures based on psychological injury.  See id. at 1059 
(upholding upward departure for psychological harm where evidence 
showed, among other things, that victim suffered from high blood 
pressure and remained under doctor's care as a result of 
defendant's actions).  Therefore, we cannot find that the victims 
suffered psychological or physical harm, which exceeded that 
19 
occurring in the heartland of fraud offenses, to such a degree as 
to justify an upward departure.0 
 The court also granted a one point upward departure on 
the grounds that "[t]he offense itself contributed materially to 
the destruction of the reputation of the insurance industry in 
the territory."  App. at 410.  The court stated that "[t]here is 
no doubt in the court's mind that Neadle's acts contributed 
substantially to a loss of confidence in an important 
institution."  App. at 411.  Again, the court based the upward 
departure not on sworn testimony but on an unsupported judicial 
conclusion.0   Such judicial speculation cannot provide the basis 
for an upward departure. 
V. 
                                                           
0
 See United States v. Pelkey, 29 F.3d 11, 15-16 (1st 
Cir. 1994) (finding that victims' feelings of lack of trust, 
frustration, shock, and depression were not "so far beyond the 
heartland of fraud offenses as to constitute psychological harm 
within the meaning of the Policy Statement in § 5K2.3 or" the 
application note to § 2F1.1); United States v. Mandel, 991 F.2d 
55, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding psychological injuries of 
victims insufficient to warrant upward departure from base 
offense level where "both the base offense level for fraud and 
the vulnerable-victim adjustment had already taken into account 
the harm to the victims"). 
0
 The lack of evidence supporting this ground for 
departure is evident from the record of the hearing at which 
Neadle raised his objections to the Presentence Report.  Asked 
for evidence regarding loss of confidence in the industry, the 
government attorney merely cited conversations with fifteen AMPAC 
insureds who "did not hold the insurance industry in very high 
regard," meetings "with people on the street," and evidence from 
"reading newspapers."  App. at 230-31.  Indeed, based on the 
hearing, the court weakened the original language of the report 
to state broadly that the offense "contributed to the general 
decline in the confidence and esteem held for the insurance 
industry."  App. at 231.   
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 We conclude that the district court correctly 
calculated the loss arising from Neadle's fraud as the net, 
adjusted loss to those victims whose property was insured with 
AMPAC at the time Hurricane Hugo struck St. Croix, reduced by the 
amount of the company's reinsurance.  Nevertheless, we will 
vacate the judgment of sentence and remand this case for 
resentencing, because the district court improperly increased 
Neadle's guideline sentence by two levels, based on caused or 
risked physical or psychological harm and on loss of confidence 
in the insurance industry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States of America v. Lawrence Neadle, Jr., Appellant 
No. 94-7417  
 
2 
BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
 This appeal presents an important question regarding 
the definition of "loss" under the fraud section of the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines" or "USSG"), USSG 
§2F1.1(b).  We must determine whether this definition 
incorporates a causation requirement, and if so, what that 
requirement entails.  Because the majority fails to explicitly 
address this issue, and because I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion as to the determination of loss, I do not join in 
Parts III and V of the majority opinion.  I do join, however, in 
Parts I, II, and IV. 
 The majority affirms the district court's calculation 
of loss without giving sufficient attention to the nexus between 
Lawrence Neadle's illegal conduct -- misrepresentations that 
AMPAC had complied with the requirement that insurance companies 
have $700,000 in unencumbered assets -- and the $20 million in 
unpaid AMPAC claims.  This inattention is not surprising given 
the Guidelines' lack of guidance on the definition of loss. 
Indeed, USSG § 2F1.1 seems to envision loss as a readily apparent 
financial harm existing independent of legal definitions. 
 While the amount of unpaid AMPAC claims may, at first 
glance, seem to be the relevant financial harm, the severe 
consequences of criminal penalties impose on courts the duty to 
undertake a more searching inquiry.  Legal concepts must be 
susceptible to definition, and it is our duty to explicate these 
definitions.  We have performed this task before, see, e.g., 
United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1991) (defining loss 
3 
under USSG § 2F1.1), and it is now necessary to do it again.  The 
Guidelines' language, its commentary, the caselaw, and sound 
sentencing policy all lead me to conclude that a financial harm 
is loss under section 2F1.1 only if it was caused by the 
defendant's illegal conduct.  This causation requirement demands, 
at the least, that the defendant's conduct be a "cause in fact" 
of the harm at issue, i.e., that the harm would not have occurred 
but for the defendant's conduct. 
 I dissent because, applying the "but for" standard, the 
record contains insufficient evidence to find that Neadle's fraud 
was a cause of the $20 million in unpaid claims.  Because of this 
error in loss calculation, I would vacate and remand for 
resentencing. 
 
I. Causation as an Element of Loss 
 In my view, the Guidelines require a finding of 
causation before a harm may be used as loss for purposes of 
section 2F1.1.  The causation requirement, pervasive in the 
criminal law, see infra part II, is made explicit in the language 
of the Guidelines and is buttressed by caselaw and policy 
considerations. 
 
A. The Language of the Sentencing Guidelines 
 The plain language of the Guidelines dictates that 
courts must make a finding of causation before assigning some 
harm as loss under section 2F1.1.  Although the text of section 
2F1.1 contains no definition of the specific offense 
4 
characteristic loss, the Guidelines provide for such deficiencies 
by establishing default rules that govern, inter alia, what 
conduct and harms are relevant to determining specific offense 
characteristics.  One of these default rules makes clear that 
courts may consider only those harms that were caused by the 
defendant's conduct.  Because no other provision of the 
Guidelines provides instructions to the contrary, this default 
rule governs the determination of loss under section 2F1.1. 
 Because the loss table in effect at the time of 
sentencing -- the 1993 loss table -- would provide for a greater 
penalty than would the loss table in effect at the time of the 
offense -- the 1988 loss table -- the 1988 Guidelines apply in 
their entirety.0  Thus, except where noted, my discussion is 
based on the 1988 Guidelines. 
                                                           
0USSG § 1B1.11(b)(1) (1994) states that "[i]f the court 
determines that use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the 
date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the ex post 
facto clause of the United States Constitution, the court shall 
use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the offense 
of conviction was committed."  USSG § 1B1.11(b)(2) (1994) then 
states that "[t]he Guidelines Manual in effect on a particular 
date shall be applied in its entirety."  See generally United 
States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620 (3d Cir. 1995) (explaining this 
"one book rule").  Because the loss table in effect at the time 
of sentencing provides for more jail time per dollar of loss than 
do earlier versions of the loss table, see majority opinion note 
3, the Guidelines applicable at the time of the offense apply in 
their entirety. 
 
 The question then is:  what version of the Guidelines 
was in effect at the time of Neadle's offense?  The majority and 
the district court apply the 1988 edition of the Guidelines, 
which incorporates amendments effective October 15, 1988.  They 
do this despite the fact that there is a strong argument that the 
offense for which Neadle was convicted occurred on January 5, 
1988. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Neadle was convicted of only 
the mail fraud charge alleged in count two of the indictment.  
5 
 
1. Section 1B1.3  
 The text of section 2F1.1 provides no definition of the 
term loss.  It simply states that "[i]f the loss exceeded $2,000, 
increase the offense level as follows," and then provides a table 
of sentencing increases based on different amounts of loss.  See 
USSG § 2F1.1(b).  Thus, we must look elsewhere for the definition 
of loss. 
 The first place to look is Chapter 1, Part B of the 
Guidelines, which provides guidance on how to interpret the 
Guidelines' sometimes sparse provisions.  Within this chapter, 
USSG § 1B1.3 specifies what information courts may consider in 
determining, inter alia, specific offense characteristics such as 
loss under 2F1.1.  See USSG § 1B1.3(a).  The information 
specified in section 1B1.3(a) is the only information relevant to 
determining specific offense characteristics "[u]nless otherwise 
specified" by another provision of the Guidelines.  Id.; see also 
USSG § 1B1.3 Background ("Subsection (a) establishes a rule of 
construction by specifying, in the absence of more explicit 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Count two charges that the crime of mail fraud occurred on 
January 5, 1988, when Neadle mailed a letter to the Insurance 
Division stating that its assets were unencumbered.  
Nevertheless, the district court's judgment states that the 
offense was concluded on October 31, 1989. The district court's 
finding as to the duration of the offense seems justified by the 
fact that Neadle concealed his initial mail fraud by continuously 
filing false quarterly reports.  Although it is unclear whether 
Neadle accepts the district court's finding as to the duration of 
his offense, he seems to acquiesce in the use of the 1988 
Guidelines.  Because of Neadle's acquiescence and the agreement 
of the government, the district court, and the majority that the 
1988 Guidelines apply, I will use the 1988 Guidelines as well. 
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instructions in the context of a specific guideline, the range of 
conduct that is relevant to determining the offense level . . . 
."). 
 Section 1B1.3(a) establishes several important 
interpretive rules.  Subsection (a)(1) states that specific 
offense characteristics will be based only on the following 
conduct:  acts and omissions committed, aided and abetted by the 
defendant, or for "which the defendant would be otherwise 
accountable" (defined as conduct counseled, commanded, induced, 
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant, reasonably 
foreseeable acts in furtherance of a conspiracy, or, conduct 
underlying a conviction for solicitation, misprision or accessory 
after the fact that reasonably should have been known by the 
defendant)0 "that occurred during the commission of the offense 
                                                           
0Application Note 1 defines "conduct 'for which the defendant is 
otherwise accountable'" as follows: 
 
Conduct "for which the defendant is otherwise 
accountable," as used in subsection (a)(1), 
includes conduct that the defendant 
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or 
willfully caused.  If the conviction is for 
conspiracy, it includes conduct in 
furtherance of the conspiracy that was known 
to or was reasonably foreseeable by the 
defendant.  If the conviction is for 
solicitation, misprision or accessory after 
the fact, it includes all conduct relevant to 
determining the offense level for the 
underlying offense that was known to or 
reasonably should have been known by the 
defendant. 
 
USSG § 1B1.3 Application Note 1 (citations omitted).  This 
definition has been, for the most part, incorporated into the 
text of the current version of section 1B1.3.  See USSG § 
1B1.3(a)(1) (1994).  We may consider subsequent amendments to the 
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of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course 
of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that 
offense, or that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense." 
USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1).  Except for a special class of offenses --
"offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would require 
grouping of multiple counts" -- this is the only conduct courts 
may consider absent an expression of contrary intent.0 
 More importantly, subsection (a)(3) establishes a 
causation requirement with respect to harms.  Unless otherwise 
specified, the only harm that is to be taken into account in 
determining a specific offense characteristic is harm "that 
resulted from" the acts and omissions identified above "if the 
harm . . . was caused" with the requisite level of intent, and 
harm that was "the object of such acts and omissions."  USSG 
§1B1.3(a)(3) (emphasis added).0  That the harm must be caused 
with some bad intent necessitates that the harm be caused in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Guidelines "to the extent that such amendments are clarifying 
rather than substantive changes."  USSG § 1B.11(b)(2) (1994). 
0
"Solely with respect to offenses of a character for which 
§3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts," courts may 
also take into account "all such acts and omissions that were 
part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as 
the offense of conviction."  USSG § 1B1.3(a)(2). 
0In full, Section 1B1.3(a)(3) states that courts may consider 
 
all harm or risk of harm that resulted from 
the acts and omissions specified in 
subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, if the 
harm or risk was caused intentionally, 
recklessly or by criminal negligence, and all 
harm or risk that was the object of such acts 
or omissions. 
 
USSG § 1B1.3(a)(3). 
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first place.  Furthermore, the plain meaning of "resulted from" 
connotes causation.  Indeed, Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary defines the verb "result" as follows:  "to proceed, 
spring, or arise as a consequence, effect, or conclusion." 
Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language 
1937 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1966).  Thus, absent an expression 
to the contrary, a court may take into account only harm that 
"arose as a consequence" of the defendant's conduct -- and only 
if that harm was "caused" with some bad intent -- and (perhaps 
for offenses that were thwarted prior to their completion) harm 
that was "the object" or purpose of the defendant's conduct.0 
                                                           
0I recognize that subsequent versions of the Guidelines have 
deleted the requirement that the harm be caused with bad intent, 
as well as the "risk of harm" language.  In the 1994 Guidelines, 
for example, section 1B1.3(a)(3) states that courts may consider 
"all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in 
subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the 
object of such acts and omissions."  The Committee explained 
these changes as follows: 
 
The purpose of this amendment is to delete 
language pertaining to "risk of harm" and 
"state of mind" as unnecessary.  Cases in 
which the guidelines specifically address 
risk of harm or state of mind are covered in 
the amended guideline under subsection (a)(4) 
[formerly subsection (a)(5)].  In addition, 
the amendment deletes reference to harm 
committed "intentionally, recklessly, or by 
criminal negligence" as unnecessary and 
potentially confusing. 
 
USSG Appendix C, Amendment 76, p. 86 (1994).  To the extent these 
changes can be characterized as "clarifying rather than 
substantive changes," which we are invited to take into account 
in understanding an earlier version of the Guidelines, see USSG 
§1B.11(b)(2) (1994), they do not change my view that the 
Guidelines establish a causation requirement.  Section 
1B1.3(a)(3) retains the "resulted from" language, which, as I 
state in the text, connotes causation. 
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 Because loss under section 2F1.1 is clearly a "harm" 
within the meaning of section 1B1.3, see USSG § 1B1.3 Application 
Note 3 (defining "harm" as "bodily injury, monetary loss, 
property damage and any resulting harm" (emphasis added)), 
section 1B1.3's requirement of causation applies.  Thus, if no 
other Guideline provisions addressed the definition of loss, the 
bare statement in the text of section 2F1.1 to increase the 
defendant's sentence on the basis of loss must be read to include 
a requirement of causation. 
 
2. Other Guidelines Provisions 
 Turning now to other provisions of the Guidelines that 
address the issue of loss, the question is not whether they 
explicitly state a causation requirement, but whether they 
contradict the rule of causation established by section 1B1.3.  I 
conclude that the Application Notes to section 2F1.1, and the 
materials referenced therein, only reinforce 1B1.3's causation 
requirement. 
 Application Note 7 to section 2F1.1 deals specifically 
with the definition of loss, but it provides little guidance.  It 
states as follows:  
Valuation of loss is discussed in the 
Commentary to § 2B1.1 (Larceny, Embezzlement, 
and Other Forms of Theft).  In keeping with 
the Commission's policy on attempts, if a 
probable or intended loss that the defendant 
was attempting to inflict can be determined, 
that figure would be used if it was larger 
than the actual loss.  For example, if the 
fraud consisted of attempting to sell $40,000 
in worthless securities, or representing that 
a forged check for $40,000 was genuine, the 
10 
"loss" would be treated as $40,000 for 
purposes of this guideline. 
USSG § 2F1.1 Application Note 7. 
 The Commentary to section 2B1.1 (the Guideline for 
"Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft"), referenced 
above, provides slightly more guidance: 
"Loss" means the value of the property taken, 
damaged or destroyed.  Ordinarily, when 
property is taken or destroyed the loss is 
the fair market value of the particular 
property at issue.  Where the market value is 
difficult to ascertain or inadequate to 
measure harm to the victim, the court may 
measure loss in some other way, such as 
reasonable replacement cost to the victim. 
When property is damaged, the loss is the 
cost of repairs, not to exceed the loss had 
the property been destroyed. 
USSG § 2B1.1 Application Note 2.  Thus, for theft and similar 
crimes, the Guidelines state that "'[l]oss' means the value of 
the property taken, damaged, or destroyed." 
 This definition certainly does not negate section 
1B1.3's background rule of causation.  If anything, the 
definition itself suggests a causation requirement.  Implicit in 
this definition is that loss means the value of the property 
taken, damaged, or destroyed by the defendant.  The terms 
"taken," "damaged," and "destroyed" have meaning only insofar as 
there is a subject -- a taker, damager, or destroyer.  In this 
context, the subject must be the defendant -- the person being 
sentenced for taking, damaging, or destroying some property.  In 
other words, loss for purposes of section 2B1.1 is the value of 
11 
the property that the defendant caused to be taken, damaged, or 
destroyed.0 
 Another provision touching on the concept of loss is 
Application Note 8 to section 2F1.1, which deals with loss 
estimation.  It states: 
The amount of loss need not be precise.  The 
court is not expected to identify each victim 
and the loss he suffered to arrive at an 
exact figure.  The court need only make a 
reasonable estimate of the range of loss, 
given the available information.  The 
estimate may be based on the approximate 
number of victims and an estimate of the 
average loss to each victim, or on more 
general factors, such as the nature and 
duration of the fraud and the revenues 
generated by similar operations.  Estimates 
based upon aggregate "market loss" (e.g., the 
aggregate decline in market value of a stock 
resulting from disclosure of information that 
was wrongfully withheld or misrepresented) 
are especially appropriate for securities 
cases.  The offender's gross gain from 
committing the fraud is an alternative 
estimate that ordinarily will underestimate 
the loss. 
USSG § 2F1.1 Application Note 8.  This provision's discussion of 
loss estimation does not undercut the background requirement of 
causation.  
 The only provision that explicitly mentions the issue 
of causation is Application Note 11.  It states: 
In a few instances, the total dollar loss 
that results from the offense may overstate 
                                                           
0As I explain below, see infra section I.B, we have held that 
loss for purposes of section 2B1.1 is not identical to loss for 
purposes of section 2F1.1, despite the latter's reference to the 
former's definition.  My point here is simply that nothing in the 
commentary to section 2B1.1 undercuts the rule that only harms in 
some sense caused by the defendant can be assigned as loss under 
section 2F1.1. 
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its seriousness.  Such situations typically 
occur when a misrepresentation is of limited 
materiality or is not the sole cause of the 
loss.  Examples would include understating 
debts to a limited degree in order to obtain 
a substantial loan which the defendant 
genuinely expected to repay; attempting to 
negotiate an instrument that was so obviously 
fraudulent that no one would seriously 
consider honoring it; and making a 
misrepresentation in a securities offering 
that enabled the securities to be sold at 
inflated prices, but where the value of the 
securities subsequently declined in 
substantial part for other reasons.  In such 
instances, a downward departure may be 
warranted. 
USSG § 2F1.1 Application Note 11. 
 The phrase "when a misrepresentation is . . . not the 
sole cause of the loss" might suggest that the loss figure can 
include harms not caused by the defendant.  But this is a 
misreading of the Application Note.  That the defendant's conduct 
need not be the sole cause of the loss in no way excuses that 
conduct from being a cause.0  The availability of a downward 
                                                           
0My view is not changed by subsequent amendments to the 
Application Notes to section 2F1.1.  Even if these amendments are 
given weight as "clarifying" changes, I do not find them 
sufficient to overcome the background rule of causation.  In lieu 
of Application Note 11, Application Note 7 to section 2F1.1, 
which deals specifically with the definition of "loss," now 
contains an additional paragraph:  
There are, however, instances where 
additional factors are to be considered in 
determining the loss or intended loss: 
 
 . . . . 
 
(b) Fraudulent Loan Application and Contract 
Procurement Cases 
 
In fraudulent loan application cases and 
contract procurement cases, the loss is 
the actual loss to the victim (or if the 
13 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
loss has not yet come about, the 
expected loss).  For example, if a 
defendant fraudulently obtains a loan by 
misrepresenting the value of his assets, 
the loss is the amount of the loan not 
repaid a the time the offense is 
discovered, reduced by the amount the 
lending institution has recovered (or 
can expect to recover) from any assets 
pledged to secure the loan.  However, 
where the intended loss is greater than 
the actual loss, the intended loss is to 
be used. 
 
In some cases, the loss determined above 
may significantly understate or 
overstate the seriousness of the 
defendant's conduct.  For example, where 
the defendant substantially understated 
his debts to obtain a loan, which he 
nevertheless repaid, the loss determined 
above (zero loss) will tend not to 
reflect adequately the risk of loss 
created by the defendant's conduct. 
Conversely, a defendant may understate 
his debts to a limited degree to obtain 
a loan (e.g., to expand a grain export 
business), which he genuinely expected 
to repay and for which he would have 
qualified at a higher interest rate had 
he made truthful disclosure, but he is 
unable to repay the loan because of some 
unforeseen event (e.g., an embargo 
imposed on grain exports) which would 
have caused a default in any event.  In 
such a case, the loss determined above 
may overstate the seriousness of the 
defendant's conduct.  Where the loss 
determined above significantly 
understates or overstates the 
seriousness of the defendant's conduct, 
an upward or downward departure may be 
warranted. 
 
USSG § 2F1.1 Application Note 7 (1994).  In the second example in 
this note -- the grain exporter example -- the Guidelines seem to 
assign as "loss" a harm that would have occurred regardless of 
the defendant's fraud.  The example assumes that the grain 
exporter would have (1) obtained the loan whether or not he 
14 
departure for situations in which a misrepresentation is not the 
"sole cause" of the loss simply accounts for the fact that some 
events have multiple causes.  If causes beyond the defendant's 
control played a large role in the loss, a downward departure may 
be justified.  If anything, the Note's discussion of a 
misrepresentation that is not the "sole cause" of the loss 
implies that such misrepresentation is a cause of the loss, and 
the Note thus supports the need for a finding of causation.  See 
United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 1991) 
("Application Note 11 made it clear that actual loss was how much 
better off the victim would be but for the defendant's fraud.  To 
the extent actual loss had other, more proximate causes, a 
discretionary downward departure . . . might be appropriate." 
(emphasis added)).0 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
committed fraud; and (2) defaulted on the loan whether or not he 
committed fraud. Nevertheless, the example suggests that the lack 
of causation is a ground for downward departure, and thus, the 
argument goes, the lack of causation should not be factored into 
"loss" in the first instance. 
 
 I reject this argument for the same reasons that I 
state in the text.  In addition, I note that the grain exporter 
example is stated under the heading "Fraudulent Loan Application 
and Contract Procurement Cases," of which the present case is 
neither. 
0The statements from Kopp quoted in the text shed light on some 
other confusing language from that case.  Language in Kopp 
arguably suggests that Application Note 11 mandates taking 
account of the lack of causation only by way of making a downward 
departure, and not by adjusting the amount of loss: 
 
The government is correct on one point, 
however:  Application Note 11 definitively 
rejected adjusting the "loss" itself downward 
to reflect other causes beyond the 
defendant's control.  As an example of when 
the dollar loss may overstate the seriousness 
15 
 In the end, the Application Notes to section 2F1.1, and 
the materials referenced therein, only reinforce 1B1.3's 
causation requirement.  Reading these materials together with the 
background rule of causation, the Guidelines seem to contemplate 
the following approach:  The court should first make an estimate 
of the loss, i.e., the financial harm caused by the defendant. If 
the harm caused by the defendant was also caused by other factors 
beyond the defendant's control, the court should consider making 
a downward departure to better reflect the seriousness of the 
defendant's offense. 
 
B. Caselaw 
 This Court's caselaw also suggests the presence of a 
causation requirement in the definition of loss.  In United 
States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521, we exhaustively analyzed the 
definition of loss under section 2F1.1.  We concluded that the 
definition of loss for fraud sentencing under section 2F1.1 is 
not the same as section 2B1.1's "amount taken" rule even though 
section 2F1.1 makes reference to section 2B1.1's definition of 
loss.  See id. at 529 ("Application Note 7 to USSG § 2F1.1 does 
not say that the definitions of 'loss' for theft and fraud cases 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the defense and hence a downward departure 
may be appropriate, Application Note 11 
included situations where the 
"misrepresentation . . . is not the sole 
cause of the loss." 
 
951 F.2d at 531.  However, this language was followed immediately 
by the statements quoted in the text, which make clear that we 
were speaking of situations in which the defendant caused the 
loss, but where other factors also played a causal role. 
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are identical, just that '[v]aluation of loss is discussed in the 
Commentary to § 2B1.1 . . . .").  In Kopp, the defendant procured 
a bank loan by means of fraudulent misrepresentations.  The 
district court calculated loss as the full amount of the loan, 
despite the fact that the victim of the fraud -- the bank --
recovered most of the loan amount by selling the property 
securing the loan.  In rejecting the government's argument that 
loss was appropriately calculated because the face value of the 
loan was the amount "taken," USSG § 2B1.1 Note 2, we sought to 
develop a sensible definition of loss for the fraud context. 
Thus, we defined "fraud 'loss' as . . . the amount of money the 
victim has actually lost."  Id. at 536.0 
 Although we were not directly confronted with the 
causation issue we face here, we suggested that our definition of 
fraud loss as "the amount of money the victim has actually lost" 
incorporates a causation requirement.  We stated, in response to 
the government's argument, that "Application Note 11 [of the 
original Guidelines] made it clear that actual loss was how much 
better off the victim would be but for the defendant's fraud." 
Id. at 531 (emphasis added).  This "but for" statement is a 
classic articulation of the causation requirement.  See infra 
part II.  More importantly, the fairness concerns that drove Kopp 
are very much present in this case.  In Kopp, we were concerned 
with the district court's assignment as loss a financial harm 
that had not occurred.  Although the issue here -- the district 
                                                           
0The current Guidelines incorporate this definition of fraud 
loss.  See USSG § 2F1.1 Application Note 7 (1994). 
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court's assignment as loss a financial harm that did occur but 
which may not have been caused by the defendant -- is perhaps 
analytically distinct, it shares the same basic problem: 
punishing the defendant for harm that he or she did not cause. 
 I also note that this Court and others have repeatedly 
suggested the need for finding causation in making a loss 
determination.  See, e.g., United States v. Daddona, 34 F.3d 163, 
170 (3d Cir.) (remanding for resentencing because the record did 
not contain any indication that the loss figure used by the 
district court "was due to the fraud of the appellants"), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 515 (1994); United States v. Marlatt, 24 F.3d 
1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying proximate cause analysis in 
assessing the district court's determination of loss); United 
States v. Harper, 32 F.3d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1994) ("What we do 
insist upon, however, is use of a realistic, economic approach to 
determining what losses he truly caused or intended to cause . . 
. ."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1162 (1995); United States v. 
Wilson, 980 F.2d 259, 262 (4th Cir. 1992) ("When the offense 
involves making a false statement, the inquiry to determine loss 
must focus on the amount of loss related to the false 
statement."). 
 
C. Policy Considerations 
 Finally, good sentencing policy requires that there be 
a causal link between the defendant's crime and the harm on which 
his or her sentence is based.  This causation requirement effects 
two fundamental Guidelines sentencing policies:  First, that 
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courts sentence defendants according to "the nature and degree of 
the harm caused by the[ir] offense[s],"  United States v. Kopp, 
951 F.2d 521, 529 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(c)(3) 
(West Supp. 1991)) (emphasis added); and second, that courts 
sentence similarly situated defendants similarly, see id.; USSG 
Part A, section 3, p. 1.2 (1988) ("Congress sought uniformity in 
sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed 
by different federal courts for similar criminal conduct by 
similar offenders.")  Sentencing defendants on the basis of 
fortuitous harm that they in no sense caused would thwart both of 
these policies. 
 
D. Conclusion 
 In summary, I am convinced that a harm cannot be 
considered loss under section 2F1.1 unless the defendant's 
conduct was a cause of that harm.  The causation requirement 
emanates from the interpretive principles of section 1B1.3, the 
provisions of the fraud and theft guidelines, and is supported by 
caselaw and policy considerations.  However, because of the 
sparse and sometimes confusing guidance provided by the 
Application Notes, I believe that the Sentencing Commission 
should articulate a comprehensive approach to determining loss. 
Until that time, I believe that my approach best harmonizes the 
many provisions at issue and best accords with fundamental 
sentencing policy.   
 
II. The Content of the Causation Requirement 
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 Having established that the Guidelines contemplate a 
causation requirement in its definition of loss, I must now 
address the more difficult question of the content of the 
causation requirement.  I need not, however, establish a 
comprehensive definition of causation under the Guidelines, for 
the figure approved by the majority -- the $20 million in unpaid 
claims -- fails even the most minimal causation test.  In 
addition, it would be unwise to embark on such an ambitious task 
when subsequent cases faced with concrete problems can better 
resolve the various issues raised. 
 The notion of causation runs throughout the law --
including the criminal law -- and it is generally understood to 
encompass two concepts.  A defendant's conduct must generally be 
both the "cause in fact" and the "proximate cause" of some harm 
before liability is imposed.  See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. 
Scott, Jr., 1 Substantive Criminal Law § 3.12, at 393-99 (1986); 
Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 363-64 (5th ed. 
1990); 4 Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 20.2, at 89-
90, § 20.4, at 130-33 (2d ed. 1986) ("Harper, James, & Gray"); W. 
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 41, 
at 263-65 (5th ed. 1984) ("Prosser & Keeton").  While neither of 
these concepts are susceptible to uncontroversial definitions, a 
working understanding of them is useful. 
 The requirement of cause in fact purports to be an 
empirical test of whether the defendant's conduct was a necessary 
antecedent to the harm at issue.  See, e.g., Harper, James, & 
Gray, supra § 20.2, at 89-91.   The most common expression of 
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this test is the "but for" formulation:  the defendant's conduct 
is a cause in fact of some harm if the harm would not have 
occurred but for the defendant's conduct.  See LaFave & Scott, 
supra, at 393-94; Harper, James, & Gray, supra, § 20.2, at 91; 
Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 265-66.  LaFave and Scott note that 
the Model Penal Code and several state codes put forth the "but 
for" test explicitly.  See LaFave & Scott, supra, at 394 n.11 
(stating that "Model Penal Code § 2.03(1) declares that conduct 
'is the cause of a result when . . . it is an antecedent but for 
which the result in question would not have occurred'" and citing 
similar state codes). 
 Courts sometimes apply a different test -- the 
"substantial factor" formulation -- to special causation problems 
not adequately addressed by the "but for" test.  For example, 
when the conduct of each of two actors acting independently could 
have caused the harm at issue, and thus neither is the "but for" 
cause, courts generally hold both actors liable under the 
substantial factor test.  See, e.g., Prosser & Keeton, supra, at 
268.   
 Proximate cause, on the other hand, is a more 
explicitly policy-based determination of whether an actor's 
conduct, despite its being a cause in fact, is too tenuously 
linked to the injury to hold the actor liable.  See, e.g., 
Prosser & Keeton, supra, § 42, at 272-73 (5th ed. 1984).  Courts 
have used various different tests to address this issue.  See, 
e.g., id. at 273-80. 
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 In this case, we are concerned only with the 
requirement of cause in fact.0  Because the facts do not present 
any special causation problems, I need only apply the standard 
"but for" test.  I now turn to a review of the facts and 
application of the "but for" test to them. 
 
III. Application of the Causation Requirement 
A. The Misrepresentation  
 I take issue with the majority's assertion that on the 
facts of this case, there is a "clear causal connection between 
the fraud and the policy holders' losses."  Neadle's only fraud 
was in misrepresenting that he had $700,000 of unsecured assets 
backing his insurance venture.  In order to conclude, as the 
majority and district court do, that this fraud was a "but for" 
cause of the over $20 million in unpaid claims, one must make the 
following inferences:  first, that had Neadle not committed 
fraud, he would not have obtained an insurance license; second, 
that the AMPAC insureds would have thus purchased insurance from 
other insurance companies; and third, that these insurance 
companies would have paid all of their Hurricane Hugo related 
claims.0  While these inferences might be plausible in theory, 
                                                           
0It may ultimately be appropriate to hold that only harm 
proximately caused by the defendant's conduct can be deemed 
"loss." See United States v. Marlatt, 24 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (applying proximate cause analysis to a district 
court's determination of loss).  However, it is unnecessary to 
reach this question on the facts of this case. 
0These inferences were explicit in the district court's opinion: 
 
If the defendant had not obtained his license 
by fraud, he would not have been in a 
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there is no evidence in the record to support them.  In fact, 
record evidence undercuts the plausibility of such inferences. 
 First, there is no evidence that Neadle would have been 
unable to obtain an insurance license without committing fraud. 
Given his ability to post $500,000 in cash when his surety bond 
was called into question, he might have found backers for another 
$700,000.  If Neadle had obtained a license legitimately, he 
could have issued insurance to the same policy holders, and AMPAC 
still would have been unable to meet the $24 million in Hurricane 
Hugo claims.  At best, the policyholders would have obtained an 
additional $700,000.0 
 Second, no record evidence supports the inference that 
had AMPAC not been in the insurance business, AMPAC policy 
holders would have purchased insurance from other companies. This 
is a striking omission given the recent history of the 
unavailability of insurance in the Virgin Islands.  Indeed, the 
record shows that only local companies wrote policies for the 
same kinds of customers and coverage that AMPAC did, and that 
there were few local companies in operation.  Deverita 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
position to issue insurance coverage and 
would not have had the customers or 
policyholders he did have.  Therefore, the 
policyholders would have obtained coverage 
from other insurance companies, companies 
that did meet Hurricane Hugo claims. 
 
0Even if AMPAC had initially held an additional $700,000 in 
unencumbered assets, it is unclear that the government or the 
policyholders would have obtained these funds.  An insurance 
company, once qualified, is not required to keep the full 
$700,000 as part of its capital structure.  Subject to certain 
limitations, an insurance company can "make use of its surplus 
for the development of its business."  22 V.I. Code § 465. 
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Sturdivant, then director of Banking and Insurance, testified 
before the grand jury as follows: 
 Considering the fact that we had very 
few companies operating in the territory at 
the time that [Neadle] came on board, as I 
said, we had a mass exodus of companies from 
the territory in '85 and we had chaos, 
basically with unauthorized companies in '87. 
And so by the time Mr. Neadle and a couple of 
other domestics came on the scene in '88, 
late '87, we felt that perhaps the market was 
turning around.  The availability problem was 
no longer acute because people were receiving 
cover [sic].  And oftentimes the small 
domestic companies were willing to provide 
the kind of coverage that many of the larger 
companies would not provide.  [The larger 
companies] often could pick and choose their 
clients. 
Thus, one cannot assume that the AMPAC policy holders would have 
found insurance elsewhere. 
 Finally, the record is devoid of evidence supporting 
the inference that other insurance companies would have met all 
of their Hurricane Hugo claims.  Rather, the record shows that at 
least one insurance company that did not misrepresent the amount 
of its assets, American Alliance, was unable to pay all of its 
Hurricane Hugo claims.  The record also shows that most of the 
small domestic insurance companies -- possibly the only companies 
covering the same kinds of risks and policyholders as AMPAC --
lacked the assets necessary to cover the huge Hurricane Hugo 
losses.  Sturdivant testified before the grand jury that "just 
about all of the companies that came on board, the small domestic 
companies, came with the minimum statutory capital and surplus 
requirements.  They came with $1.2 million and that's it."  If 
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AMPAC had not obtained a license to sell insurance, its customers 
may have purchased insurance from American Alliance or other 
companies unable to meet Hurricane Hugo claims. 
 On this record, then, I cannot conclude that Neadle's 
fraud was a cause in fact of AMPAC's inability to pay the over 
$20 million in claims.  In summary:  (1) had Neadle met the 
$700,000 requirement, AMPAC would still have been unable to pay 
the Hugo losses; (2) the district court's (and the majority's) 
intimation that other companies would have written the AMPAC 
policies is purely speculative and unsupported by the record; (3) 
if other companies were willing to provide the coverage AMPAC 
did, they may have been similarly undercapitalized; and (4) at 
least one other company that met the $700,000 requirement was 
unable to pay its Hugo claims. 
 
B. United States v. Robichaux 
 United States v. Robichaux, 995 F.2d 565 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 322 (1993), which the majority cites to 
support its decision, is distinguishable.   In that case, the 
defendant misrepresented to an auditing firm hired by the 
Louisiana Insurance Commission that securities he had assigned to 
an insurance company were unencumbered.  The firm relied on the 
defendant's statement and issued a favorable audit.  Two years 
later, the company was declared insolvent.  The Fifth Circuit 
upheld the district court's conclusion that the defendant was 
responsible for all of the losses attributable to the insurance 
company's failure. 
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 Notably, the Fifth Circuit applied a cause in fact 
analysis similar to the one I describe in this opinion.  However, 
it found that the district court's inferences were "plausible in 
light of the record read as a whole": 
It is not clearly erroneous to assume that if 
[the auditor] had not issued a favorable 
audit for [the insurance company], which only 
occurred because of [the company's] 
fraudulently inflated balance sheet, the 
Commission would have acted to liquidate the 
firm at an earlier date and minimized the 
losses. 
 Id. at 571. 
 The Fifth Circuit's holding that the district court's 
inferences were "plausible in light of the record read as a 
whole" says nothing about this case, where the record casts 
serious doubt on the plausibility of the district court's 
inferences.  To the extent Robichaux supports a relaxed inquiry 
into causation -- which I do not think is the case -- I disagree 
with it for the reasons expressed in Part I. 
 
C. The Majority's Other Arguments 
 The remainder of the majority's reasoning fares no 
better.  The majority asserts that "the deceitful and slipshod 
way in which Neadle ran the business" -- i.e., failure to keep 
proper books and misrepresentations in quarterly reports --
"supports the district court's attribution of responsibility to 
him for the [$20 million] losses."  This assertion suggests two 
possible arguments, neither of which is convincing. 
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 First, the majority might mean that Neadle's poor 
record-keeping was a cause of the unpaid AMPAC claims.  Evidence 
in the record suggests that beyond the minimum capital 
requirements, the Insurance Division policed the funds of 
insurance companies to ensure that companies maintained adequate 
reserves in proportion to the coverage they wrote.  Thus, if we 
assume that AMPAC was inadequately capitalized,0 it is possible 
that if Neadle had kept accurate books, the Insurance Division 
might have discovered the inadequacy and taken remedial measures. 
 However, even if Neadle's poor accounting was, in some 
sense, a cause of the unpaid AMPAC claims, the Guidelines do not 
allow Neadle to be sentenced on the basis of this harm.  Under 
section 1B1.3, only certain harms sufficiently connected to the 
defendant's criminal conduct can be used to calculate a specific 
offense characteristic.  See supra part I.  On a different 
record, it might be argued that Neadle's poor record-keeping was 
a means of hiding his misrepresentations and thus that harms 
caused by the poor record-keeping "occurred . . . in the course 
of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for th[e] 
offense [of conviction],"  USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1).  But here no 
record evidence suggests that Neadle's lax accounting was a means 
of avoiding detection. 
 Second, the majority might be asserting that Neadle 
meant to use AMPAC essentially to rob his clients, and thus that 
he intended to cause some significant loss.  Courts may sentence 
                                                           
0This assumption is probably not justified given the $4 million 
in reinsurance that AMPAC maintained.  See infra. 
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defendants on the basis of "intended loss" if that figure is 
greater than actual loss.  USSG § 2F1.1 Application Note 7; see 
also USSG § 1B1.3(a)(3) (stating that courts may consider harm 
that was "the object of" the defendant's conduct). 
 However, once again, there is no record evidence that 
Neadle intended any loss.  In fact, the record is replete with 
evidence to the contrary.  Neadle purchased $4 million worth of 
reinsurance, an amount, that according to his uncontroverted 
testimony, professionals had advised was sufficient.  The Virgin 
Islands did not require that companies have any reinsurance, and 
no one in the Virgin Islands government told Neadle how much 
reinsurance AMPAC should carry.  Until Hurricane Hugo, AMPAC paid 
claims promptly, and was never reprimanded or sanctioned by the 
Insurance Division for wrongful denial or failure to pay claims.  
D. The Proper Calculation of Loss 
 Having concluded that the bulk of the unpaid AMPAC 
claims was not caused by Neadle's misconduct and thus cannot be 
assigned as loss under section 2F1.1, I feel obligated to suggest 
how loss might appropriately be calculated.  In so doing, I 
question the basic model employed by the district court and the 
majority -- that loss is based on the unmet claims of the 
policyholders. 
 One reasonable estimation of loss in this case is the 
$700,000 that Neadle misrepresented as unencumbered.  Under the 
majority's model, $700,000 is a sensible loss determination on 
several grounds.  Had Neadle not committed fraud and still 
obtained an insurance license, AMPAC would probably have $700,000 
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more in assets than it does now, and the AMPAC insureds would be 
that much better off.  Or, had the AMPAC insureds bought 
insurance from other legitimately formed insurance companies, the 
evidence suggests that these companies may have been similarly 
capitalized. 
 A different model for measuring loss that is consistent 
with the text and structure of section 2F1.1 would also generate 
a figure of $700,000.  The indictment charged Neadle with 
misrepresenting the status of the $700,000 to the Virgin Islands 
government.  If we focus on the Virgin Islands as the victim of 
the fraud, the loss is the governmental or societal loss of the 
$700,000 reserve. 
  Alternatively, we might measure loss in terms of what 
Neadle obtained by virtue of his fraud.  See  USSG § 2F1.1 
Application Note 8; see also Kopp, 951 F.2d at 530 (stating that 
the defendant's gain can be used as a measure of loss when there 
is some loss but it is not measurable).  Here, Neadle obtained 
the premiums of the policyholders to whom he falsely represented 
were validly insured.  While I cannot derive this sum from the 
record, I surmise that it approaches $700,000 annually. 
 I do not deny that a sentence based on my suggested 
loss calculations might give Neadle less time than he deserves. 
To rectify this problem, the district court could depart upward 
if the case meets the departure standard (although upper 
calibration would have to start at the proper base offense 
level).  See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 
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1990).  If the resulting sentence is still too lenient, that is a 
problem that only the Commission can address. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the reasons I have stated, the Guidelines require a 
finding of causation before some harm is deemed loss under 
section 2F1.1.  This requirement demands, at the least, that the 
defendant's conduct be a cause in fact of the harm.  Because the 
record contains insufficient evidence to find that Neadle's fraud 
was a cause in fact of the $20 million in unpaid claims, I 
respectfully dissent. 
